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Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) is immune to all security loopholes
on detection. Previous experiments on MDI-QKD required spatially separated signal lasers and complicated
stabilization systems. In this paper, we perform a proof-of-principle experimental demonstration of plug-and-
play MDI-QKD over an asymmetric channel setting with a single signal laser, in which the whole system is
automatically stabilized in spectrum, polarization, arrival time and phase reference. Both the signal laser and
the single-photon detectors are in the possession of a common server. A passive timing calibration technique is
applied to ensure the precise and stable overlap of signal pulses. The results pave the way for the realization of
a quantum network, in which the users only need the encoding devices.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 89.70.Cf
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] allows the two
legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, to share an information-
theoretical secure key guaranteed by the laws of quantum
physics. Despite tremendous experimental efforts being made
in the field [3–5], an important problem in current QKD im-
plementations is the gap between its theory and practice [6–
10]. To close this gap, three main approaches have been de-
veloped. The first one is the security patch [11, 12], but it is
difficult to include all potential and unnoticed security loop-
holes. The second one is the device-independent QKD (DI-
QKD) [13–15]. This approach is still challenging with current
technology, since it requires a loophole-free Bell test. The
third approach is the measurement-device-independent QKD
(MDI-QKD) [16], which removes all detection-related secu-
rity loopholes. Such loophole is arguably the most important
issue identified in conventional QKD implementations [7–10].
Therefore, MDI-QKD is of great importance to promote the
security of practical QKD systems. In addition, with current
technology, MDI-QKD is suitable for both long distance com-
munication and metropolitan networks [29, 32].
Achievements of MDI-QKD have been made in both the-
ory [17–21] and experiment [22–29]. The experimental
demonstration of MDI-QKD requires the indistinguishability
of photons from Alice and Bob, mainly in three dimensions:
spectrum, polarization, and timing. To solve this challenge,
the active stabilization systems were normally utilized in pre-
vious experiments. For example, the feedback temperature-
control units for the distributed feedback lasers [23, 26] or
frequency-locked lasers [22, 25] were employed to match the
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spectral mode. The feedback temporal-control system was
utilized to calibrate the arrival time of signals [22, 26]. The
phase (or polarization) stabilization system was always essen-
tial in the time-bin phase-encoding (or polarization-encoding)
scheme. Recently, many proposals and demonstrations have
been made to mitigate the complexity in the implementations
of MDI-QKD [30–33]. In particular, a promising scheme is
the plug-and-play MDI-QKD [32, 33], which greatly reduces
the experimental complexity of mode matching and reference-
frame alignment. But, since the signal laser source and sin-
gle photon detectors (SPDs) are in the charge of an untrusted
server, plug-and-play MDI-QKD is vulnerable to source at-
tacks [6, 7, 9]. Fortunately, with the security analysis reported
in [32], plug-and-play MDI-QKD can be implemented even
with a single untrusted source. However, so far, an experimen-
tal demonstration of plug-and-play MDI-QKD is still miss-
ing, except for a proof-of-concept test [33] with polarization
encoding over free space channel within a few meters. This
proof-of-concept test was operated in a wavelength outside
the window of telecom-wavelength, and even so, it still needs
some stabilization measures.
In this paper, we report a demonstration of plug-and-play
MDI-QKD using time-bin phase-encoding over an asymmet-
ric channel setting, in which the two channels from Alice and
Bob to Charlie are 14 km and 22 km standard optical fibers.
The encoding optical pulses of Alice and Bob come from a
single homemade laser held by Charlie, which ensures that no
mismatch exists in both pulse waveform and optical spectrum.
Thanks to the plug-and-play architecture [34], the polarization
state is automatically calibrated and stabilized. The encod-
ing optical pulses of Alice and Bob share the same reference
frame. In the asymmetric channel setting, an experimental
challenge is how to precisely match the timing of pulses, re-
turned respectively from Alice and Bob over two mismatched
channels. We developed a passive timing calibration method
by using two synchronization lasers (operating at 1310 nm)
and multiplexing them with the signal laser (operating at 1550
2nm) via wavelength division multiplexing (WDM). As we
know, this is the first time that the passive timing calibration
method is applied in the experiment of MDI-QKD.
II. EXPERIMENT
The experimental setup of plug-and-play MDI-QKD is il-
lustrated in Figure 1(a). We implement the time-bin phase-
encoding scheme [22, 23, 26, 27, 29]. The signal laser source
(1550nm) and detectors are held by a common server (Char-
lie). The signal laser is internally modulated into a pulse train
with a width of 2 ns (FWHM) at 1 MHz repetition rate. An
asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer (AMZI) is utilized
to separate the pulses into two time bins with 20 ns time de-
lay. Alice and Bob only have the modulation devices includ-
ing phase modulators (PMs) and amplitude modulators (AMs)
for encoding. The key bit in X basis is encoded into the rel-
ative phase, 0 or pi, by PM1, while the key bit in Z basis is
encoded into the time bin, 0 or 1, by AM1. Figure 1(b) il-
lustrates the structure of AM1 [36]. AM1 contains a normal
polarizing beam splitter (PBS), a PBS with 45◦ rotation from
the optical axis, a phase modulator, and a Faraday rotator, in
which different optical intensities at the output port of PBS
are realized by modulating the relative phase between the long
path (L) and the short path (S) [37]. PM2 is used for the ac-
tive phase randomization, and AM2 is used to implement the
decoy states.
The signal pulses travel through a single mode fiber spool of
14km (22km) from Charlie to Alice (Bob). After being mod-
ulated by Alice and Bob, the pulses return to Charlie interfere
at the beam splitter (BS). A coincident detection at alterna-
tive time bins indicates a successful Bell state measurement
(BSM). At the measurement site, the BSM is implemented
with a polarization-maintaining BS and two commercial In-
GaAs SPDs (ID201) with an efficiency of 10% and a gate
width of 2.5 ns. The dead time is 10 µs with a dark count
rate of 6 × 10−6 per gate. A Bell state (Singlet) is success-
fully post-selected when a coincidence of two SPDs happens
at alternative time bins. After Charlie announces the result of
the partial BSM, Alice and Bob sift the raw key.
The crucial aspect in the experiment is the indistinguisha-
bility of signal pulses from Alice and Bob, mainly in three
dimensions: spectrum, polarization, and timing. Errors would
occur if any mismatch exists in these dimensions. In our sys-
tem, Alice and Bob share the same signal laser, which guar-
antees no mismatch in spectrum and in pulse waveform. The
active phase randomization is implemented to eliminate the
partial-phase-randomization attack. In our proof-of-principle
demonstration, a sawtooth wave with a repetition rate of 55
KHz (15 KHz) is applied to the PM2 of Alice (Bob) [38],
to globally randomize the phase of each optical pulse in the
range of [0,2pi]. Alice’s and Bob’s time bins come from the
same AMZI, so they share the same phase reference frame.
For the polarization mode, the plug-and-play architecture can
automatically compensate for the birefringence effects [34].
In the asymmetric channel setting, the pulses of Alice and
Bob travel different lengths of fibers. A challenge is to match
the temporal mode. We use two additional synchronization
lasers (SynL, 1310 nm) to calibrate the arrival time. The
whole system is synchronized in the following manner: the
SynL pulses are sent from Charlie to Alice (Bob), reflected
back by a Faraday mirror (1310 nm), and detected by a pho-
toelectric detector (PD). The output of PD is used to drive the
signal laser (1550nm) to generate the signal pulses of Bob (Al-
ice). The temporal mode difference between Alice and Bob
can be expressed as:
∆t =(t1310C⇄B + t
1550
C⇄A)− (t
1310
C⇄A + t
1550
C⇄B)
=∆t0 + (1/v1550 − 1/v1310)∆L
(1)
where ∆t0 = (1/v1550 − 1/v1310)(L0C⇄B − L0C⇄A), and
∆L = ∆LC⇄B − ∆LC⇄A. LC→B represents the fiber
length between Charlie and Bob. ∆L = αTL0∆T , where
αT = 5.4 × 10
−7/◦C is the thermal expansion coefficient of
fiber, and ∆T represents the change of temperature. The sec-
ond term in Eq. (1) is negligible since it only induces 0.14
ps with 10◦C temperature change [39]. Therefore, the arrival
time difference of signals between Alice and Bob is a con-
stant which can be compensated by adjusting the time delay
between two SynLs with a delay chip. The temporal mode
mismatch depends on the resolution of the delay chip (10ps)
which is much smaller than the width of the signal pulse (2ns).
This ensures a high-visibility interference.
III. RESULTS
In our demonstration, the optical pulses are modulated
into three different intensities according to the decoy state
method [35], namely signal state intensity (µ = 0.4), de-
coy state intensity (ν = 0.1) and vacuum state intensity
(ω = 0.01). The optical intensities of a certain basis are put
into 9 pairs. The experimental gains and quantum bit error
rates (QBER) for different intensity combinations are listed
in Table I and Table II. The QBERs of Z-basis are due to the
extinction ratio of AM1 and the background counts (Rayleigh
backscattering and detectors’ dark counts). In the ideal case,
the QBERs of Z-basis should be 0. While, in X-basis, the
vacuum and multiphoton components of weak coherent states
cause accidental coincidences which introduce an error rate of
50%. Thus, the error rate of X-basis has an expected value of
25%.
The secure key is extracted from the data when both Alice
and Bob encode their bits using signal states (µ) in the Z basis.
The rest data is applied to estimate the parameters used in the
secure key rate calculation. In the asymptotic case, the secure
key rate is given by [16]
R ≥ q{QZ,Lµµ,11[1−H(e
X,U
11 )]−Q
Z
µµfH(E
Z
µµ)}, (2)
where q, QZµµ, and EZµµ are the possibility, overall gain, and
QBER when Alice and Bob send the signal states in the Z
basis. QZ,Lµµ,11 = µ2e−2µY
Z,L
11 , where Y
Z,L
11 is a lower bound
of the yield of single photon states in the Z basis; eX,U11 is an
upper bound of the QBER of the single photon states in the X
34
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FIG. 1. (a) Experimental setup of the plug-and-play MDI-QKD. The synchronization optical pulses (1310nm) are sent out by Charlie. They
travel to Alice (Bob), and are reflected back by a Faraday mirror (1310nm). A homemade photoelectric detector (PD) is utilized to detect them
and output the system clock. Then, the signal laser (1550nm) generates the optical pulses of Bob (Alice). The time bins are generated by an
AMZI in Charlie. The clients (Alice and Bob) receive the time-bin pulses and encode the bits. Then, the signals are reflected back to Charlie
for the partial BSM. ConSys, control system; SynL, synchronization laser; CIR, circulator; BS, beam splitter; PC, polarization controller;
WDM, wavelength division multiplexer; Attn, attenuator; FM, Faraday mirror; SPD, single-photon detector. (b) Schematic of the amplitude
modulator (AM1): PBS, polarizing beam splitter; 450 PBS, polarizing beam splitter with 450 from the optical axis; PM, phase modulator; FR,
Faraday rotator.
basis; Y Z,L11 and e
X,U
11 can be estimated from the decoy state
method; f is the error correction efficiency; H is the binary
Shannon entropy function. A total number ofN = 6.14×1010
pulses are sent out in the experiment. We take the value q =
1
18 and f = 1.16 in our calculation. By using the analytical
bounds derived in [35], we obtain that Y Z,L11 = 2.2 × 10−3
and eX,Uµµ,11 = 5.07% (see Appendix A). Finally, a secure key
rate of R = 4.7× 10−6 bits per pulse is demonstrated.
TABLE I. Experimental values of gains QZ(X)IAIB (×10
−4). IA and IB
are the optical intensities of Alice and Bob.
Z-basis X-basis
IA IB
µ ν ω µ ν ω
µ 1.819 0.547 0.125 9.018 4.347 3.408
ν 0.624 0.217 0.0378 4.316 0.925 0.323
ω 0.130 0.0386 0.0050 5.207 0.323 0.0115
IV. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
We discuss the limitations of our proof-of-principle exper-
iment and possible solutions. First, the plug-and-play MDI-
QKD is vulnerable to various source attacks [6, 7, 9], since
the signal source is totally controlled by an untrusted server.
With the assumptions including the single mode assumption,
the phase randomization assumption, and the trust of the mon-
itoring devices, a complete security analysis for plug-and-play
TABLE II. Experimental values of QBERs. Error bars represent one
standard deviation.
Z-basis X-basis
IA IB
µ ν ω µ ν ω
µ 0.0188 0.0378 0.136 0.269 0.341 0.483
±0.001 ±0.004 ±0.009 ±0.007 ±0.007 ±0.009
ν 0.0356 0.0450 0.133 0.351 0.278 0.428
±0.003 ±0.003 ±0.013 ±0.008 ±0.012 ±0.012
ω 0.151 0.133 0.194 0.484 0.432 0.368
±0.005 ±0.01 ±0.04 ±0.008 ±0.015 ±0.052
MDI-QKD was derived in [32]. It shows that, with careful
source monitoring, we can rigorously derive a lower bound
of the secure key generation rate even with an unknown and
untrusted source. According to the security analysis in [32],
the energy and arrival time of each signal pulse should be
monitored precisely to acquire the certain information about
the photon-number distribution and the timing mode. In our
demonstration, however, we cut down the energy of signal
pulses to reduce the Rayleigh backscattering (RBS), which
lead that the intensity detector can’t monitor such weak en-
ergy. Hence, the monitor unit was not implemented. This can
be improved by using the scheme of pulse trains, as demon-
strated in conventional plug-and-play QKD [34, 40]. Second,
in our implementation, the parameters were not optimized and
the secure key rate was only calculated in the asymptotic case.
A full parameter optimization and the finite-key effect can be
considered by using the theory in [20]. Lastly, the secure key
4generation rate can be significantly improved by increasing
the repetition rate and the detector efficiency [26].
In conclusion, we have performed a proof-of-principle
demonstration of self-stabilized asymmetric plug-and-play
MDI-QKD over 36 km fiber. The homemade laser sources and
expensive detectors are provided by a common server. The po-
larization and phase can be automatically calibrated and stabi-
lized. The passive time calibration technique ensures a precise
and stable interference of photons from two remote parties.
The techniques demonstrated in our experiment greatly im-
prove the practicability of MDI-QKD and pave the way for a
MDI quantum network with an untrusted network server.
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Appendix A: Secure key rate estimation
The secure key rate is calculated with an analytical method
with two decoy states according to [35]. Y Z,L11 is given by
Y Z,L11 =
(µ2a − ω
2
a)(µb − ωb)Q
M1
Z − (ν
2
a − ω
2
a)(νb − ωb)Q
M2
Z
(µa − ωa)(µb − ωb)(νa − ωa)(νb − ωb)(µa − νa)
(A1)
where QM1Z = Q
νaνb
Z e
(νa+νb) + QωaωbZ e
(ωa+ωb) −
QνaωbZ e
(νa+ωb) − QωaνbZ e
(ωa+νb)
, QM2Z = Q
µaµb
Z e
(µa+µb) +
QωaωbZ e
(ωa+ωb) −QµaωbZ e
(µa+ωb) −QωaµbZ e
(ωa+µb)
.
eX,U11 is
eX,U11 =
1
(νa − ωa)(νb − ωb)Y
X,L
11
[QνaνbX E
νaνb
X e
(νa+νb) +QωaωbX E
ωaωb
X e
(ωa+ωb)−
QνaωbX E
νaωb
X e
(νa+ωb) −QωaνbX E
ωaνb
X e
(ωa+νb)]
(A2)
where Y X,L11 can be achieved with a similar method to Y
Z,L
11 .
By using the above equations, we estimate the parameters
listed in Table III. In the secure key calculation, we assume
an error correction code with f = 1.16, and choose q = 118 ,
which is due to the fact that the three optical intensity states
are prepared with the same probability.
TABLE III. Parameters estimated in the process of secure key rate
estimation. QM1(2)λ (10−4), Y λ,L11 (10−3), with λ ∈ {X,Z}.
QM1λ Q
M2
λ Y
λ,L
11
Z 0.1846 3.668 2.219
X 0.4353 10.016 4.40
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